Pakistan’s diplomatic
initiatives with Afghanistan and India have both collapsed.
Afghanistan’s President Ghani and Pakistan’s prime
minister and army chief were sincere in desiring normalisation. The implicit
bargain was that Pakistan would deliver the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating
table while Afghanistan would act against Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
leaders and militants hiding in Afghan territory. Success would have implied:
enhanced security within Pakistan from TTP-engineered terrorism and attacks by
the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and an end to Indian pressure on Pakistan on
the western front; the re-emergence of the Afghan Taliban as a political force
in Kabul; and the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.
It was evident from the outset that India and hostile
elements in Afghanistan would work overtime to subvert this peace initiative.
They appear to have succeeded.
The debacle on the west is
intimately related to the disturbing developments in the east.
The Islamabad-Kabul
understanding was based on over-optimistic expectations on both sides. Ghani’s
ability to act against the TTP and the BLA was constrained by his lack of
control of the Afghan security establishment, especially the National
Directorate of Security (NDS) — Afghanistan’s intelligence agency — led by a
Karzai holdover. Kabul proved unable (or unwilling) to kill, capture or expel
Mullah Fazlullah and other TTP elements holed up in Afghanistan.
Similarly, Pakistan promised too much in offering to
bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. To do so, Islamabad was
obliged to revive or reveal its contacts with them. If the Kabul-Taliban talks
had succeeded, few would have objected to the presence of Afghan Taliban
leaders in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the revelation of Mullah Omar’s demise by
the NDS upended the talks. (Pakistan’s failure was in either not knowing of
Mullah Omar’s death or not preventing the NDS from gaining knowledge of this
while senior Taliban commanders remained unaware.)
As no doubt anticipated by the NDS and its Indian
patrons, a leadership struggle ensued between the ‘fight’ and the ‘fight and
talk’ factions within the Taliban. To salvage the talks, Pakistan’s agencies
attempted to hastily gather the Taliban leaders to select Omar’s deputy as the
new Amirul Momineen, further exposing the relationship. But the Taliban’s
fighting faction, freed of Mullah Omar’s ghost edicts supporting talks, and
fearful of losing ground to the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ (IS), escalated its
attacks within Afghanistan, particularly against targets in Kabul.
Under pressure to avoid blame for the security failures
in Kabul, and aware that Islamabad was no longer able to deliver the Taliban to
the negotiating table, President Ghani took the easy route of placing all the
blame on Pakistan. His Aug 10 statement was indistinguishable from Karzai’s
familiar diatribes against Pakistan. Chief Executive Abdullah and other factions
joined him in whipping up the anti-Pakistan animus. The ‘gathering’ of Taliban
leaders to choose Mullah Mansour as Omar’s successor was used as a basis to
extrapolate that Pakistan maintained Taliban sanctuaries and bomb-making
factories, and connived in the Taliban attacks. Ghani declared that he did not
want Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the table but to “prosecute” them.
Kabul was the scene of orchestrated demonstrations
against Pakistan, the burning of Pakistan’s national flag, calls for boycott of
trade with and even ‘jihad’ against Pakistan. A demand was made that an Afghan
delegation be immediately received by Pakistan’s prime minister and army chief.
Instead of protesting Kabul’s unsubstantiated charges and
demanding an apology for the desecration of Pakistan’s national flag,
Pakistan’s leadership meekly received the angry Afghan delegation to clear the
“misunderstanding” ( to quote Sartaj Aziz).
Pakistan will be able to evoke respect for its national
interests only if it respects its own dignity and honour. Pakistan should
demand an apology from Kabul for the desecration of its national flag and a
retraction of the wild accusations voiced by Ghani and other Afghan leaders. If
they desire a trade boycott, Pakistan should fulfil their wish and halt all
trans-shipment and transit until they reverse their hostility.
At the strategic level too, there is need for a careful
policy review to deal with an Afghanistan that is likely to be embroiled in
chaos and conflict for some time. Pakistan should: first, secure its border
against TTP and BLA infiltration from Afghan territory; second, devise
strategies to eliminate their safe havens in Afghanistan; third, promote
coherence among the Afghan Taliban; and, fourth, work with China, Russia, the
US, Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume the Kabul-Taliban talks and insulate
Afghanistan from infiltration by the IS.
The debacle on the west is intimately related to the
disturbing developments in the east. Apart from working to scuttle a
Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement, India has rejected Pakistan’s endeavours to
resume the ‘composite dialogue’ and exerted direct pressure on Pakistan to keep
it on the diplomatic and military defensive — thus the Line of Control (LoC)
violations, threatening statements and the hostile media and diplomatic
campaigns.
Instead of a muscular response, Pakistan has virtually
endorsed the Indian premises for normalisation in the Ufa statement by
restricting the Pakistan-India talks to terrorism, evoking public denunciation
within the country and disappointment from Kashmiri leaders.
The Gurdaspur incident, on the eve of the scheduled
terrorism talks, is no accident. Indian agencies are past masters at
stage-managing such events to suit their purpose. The Indian media has been
unleashed to pin blame for this incident also on Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan’s
national security adviser plans to walk blithely into this Indian entrapment in
New Delhi next week.
The right response would be to: call off this
ill-conceived exchange; respond effectively to the Indian media onslaught by
projecting India’s support for the TTP and BLA and its historic role as a state
sponsor of terrorism; protest formally to the UNMOGIP and the Security Council
about India’s LoC violations; and raise India’s human rights violations in occupied
Kashmir at the Human Rights Council and other international forums.
Instead of submitting to Modi’s agenda, Pakistan should
remind the world that: Kashmir remains a nuclear flashpoint and must be
addressed, bilaterally or multilaterally; that India’s arms build-up will
oblige Pakistan to respond appropriately; and that the danger of a disastrous
conflict can be avoided only through a comprehensive dialogue encompassing
Kashmir and reciprocal arms control between Pakistan and India.
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