Why consular access was denied to Kulbhushan Jadhav

By Jahanzaib Durrani

The case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, in some respects, bears a striking resemblance to Soviet spy William Fisher, aka Rudolf Abel, one of the most well-known Soviet spies of all time. Abel, like Kulbhushan, was an intelligence colonel of the KGB. In 1948, he slipped into the United States illegally via Canada and lived there for nine years as a photographer and painter. He was tasked to transmit the US atomic secrets to the USSR. To his surprise, he was arrested in 1957 and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. However, in 1962, just after four years of his detention, he was released to the Soviet Union in exchange for captured US pilot Francis Gary Powers.

In recent history both Kulbhushan and Abel were possibly the highest-ranking spies to face espionage charges. However, unlike Abel, Kulbhushan’s active participation in some of the deadliest attacks and terror networks in Pakistan gives him a unique position in the long list of captured spies. An overview of the charge sheet against Kulbhushan lists some of the following activities: massive terrorist activities in the country; sponsoring attacks on Hazaras; the explosion of gas pipelines; funding of Baloch separatists and miscreants through hawala/hundi; subverting the local youth of Balochistan against the state of Pakistan; planning to sabotage CPEC, etc.

A few days ago, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz provided a timeline of the trial and proceedings against Jadhav. In response, Indian officials resorted to jingoistic statements merely adding fuel to the fire. New Delhi has consistently been protesting in the international media that it had sought consular access to Jadhav 13 times, but was refused each time, counting it as an affront to justice.

Let us examine the reasons for denying consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav. The issue comes under the purview of national law and as well as international law. Pakistan is a dualist state, ie, for international treaties signed by Pakistan to be binding on local courts; implementing legislation is required domestically through the federal legislature. From the perspective of national law, the process is considered the ratification of treaties signed earlier. Interestingly, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) 1963, which “affords an individually enforceable right to consular access upon arrest or detention in a foreign country,” has not been transposed into domestic law by Pakistan in the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act of 1972. This single piece of legislation that solely talks about the ‘consular right and privileges’ are empty of any binding content purporting to provide consular access to foreign nationals arrested or detained on criminal or immigration charges. Thus Pakistan was not obligated to provide Kulbhushan Jadhav consular access as per our domestic law.

Furthermore, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not create a binding obligation on a state for providing consular access to foreign nationals arrested on criminal charges. In fact, the following para of the said Convention, Article 36 (2) makes it abundantly clear that this right “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.”

Aziz shares charge sheet against Jadhav

Therefore, Pakistan has acted within the corners of its legal ambit by not providing consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav. Had he been granted consular access it, would have been considered an ultra vires.

Furthermore, espionage is seen as inconsistent with international law since it constitutes an aggressive act against the territorial integrity of another state. Article 2(4) of the UN charter makes it very clear: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” On this subject, Quincy Wright, famous for his pioneering work and expertise in international law, says, “In time of peace […] espionage and, in fact, any penetration of the territory of a state by agents of another state in violation of the local law, is also a violation of the rule of international law imposing a duty upon states to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states”.

In view of consular access issues in the past, Pakistan and India signed a treaty on consular access to prisoners, “Pakistan-India Agreement On Consular Access, 21 May 2008”. In that treaty, both the states had agreed upon that the right of consular access should be subject to discretion in situations where the arrest was made on political or security grounds. Article 6 of that agreement unequivocally states, “In cases of arrest, detention or sentence, made on political or security grounds each side may examine any such case on its merit.” The agreement was signed between the two sovereign states and creates a binding obligation upon them to respect and comply with the agreed policy under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. India seems to want to get out of an international agreement, which is entered into with open eyes, merely because it doesn’t suit them anymore.

Also, India has been excessively relying on the VCCR 1963 in Kulbhushan’s case. However, it fails to acknowledge that Article 73 of the same Convention states, (1) The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect other international agreements in force as between States Parties to them. (2) Nothing in the present Convention shall preclude States from concluding international agreements confirming or supplementing or extending or amplifying the provisions thereof.

So concluded bilateral treaties on this subject like the one Pakistan have with India is perfectly legal and would supersede anything contained in the VCCR.

Hence, keeping in view the charge sheet against Kulbhushan Jadhav, his case provides serious grounds of public policy and public security as he had been accused of a string of terrorism offences. As a result of which, consular access has been rightly denied to Jadhav as per the terms of the 2008 treaty.

India perplexed over spy’s death sentence

Let there be no doubt that Kulbhushan had committed an international wrong for which, subject to evidence, India as a state will bear responsibility under international law. That is because Jadhav’s actions cannot be attributed to ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. According to his own confessional statements, he was an agent (a state-actor), employed by an entity of India ie The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), deputed in Chabahar, Iran, and was tasked to carry out espionage activities at the behest of RAW. Hence, a plausible case could be made against the state of India. In this regard, reliance should be placed on legally binding instruments such as Draft Articles on State Responsibility and United Nation General Assembly Resolutions 56/83 and 60/147 that are very clear that a breach of international law by a State entails its international responsibility.

Pakistan should forcefully argue its case at all international forums and employ a method to unveil India’s false, baseless and spurious propaganda against the state of Pakistan.

ICJ’s limited jurisdiction

SIKANDER AHMED SHAH | ABID RIZVI

India has approached the International Court of Justice seeking to stay the execution of Kulbhushan Jadhav. India has raised its claims before the court under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which grants the right of consular access to a foreign national “who is in prison, custody or detention” and the optional protocol to the VCCR, which establishes the ICJ as the venue for resolving disputes under the VCCR. To raise its claims, India has relied upon the court’s compromissory jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of the statute of the ICJ which allows the latter to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of a ‘special agreement’ — in this case the optional protocol.

The court’s jurisdiction in such cases is, however, limited solely to the interpretation or application of the special agreement. The court cannot decide on matters beyond the scope of the concerned treaty, and as Article 36 of the VCCR only deals with communication and contact with nationals of the sending state it does not impact convictions for espionage under domestic or international law at all. Further, Pakistan is a dualist state, wherein any international treaty signed can only be given effect domestically once it has been codified in the corpus of domestic laws through implementing legislation. Consular access has not been a right explicitly guaranteed under the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972.

Further, India’s claims rely upon a peacetime conception of international law, wherein consular officials are guaranteed access to “nationals of the sending state” tried or convicted of ordinary criminal offences. In Jadhav’s case, however, this legal framework seems inapplicable — as a spy he engaged in activities including fomenting insurgency and attempting to destabilise southwestern Pakistan. His activities would fall within the purview of International Humanitarian Law, the lex specialis or specific law governing the conduct of hostilities between nations.

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Pakistan is well within its rights to try and sentence Jadhav under its domestic laws for espionage.

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The Geneva Conventions provide much of the substance of IHL. Within this framework the Geneva Convention IV of 1949 is of particular significance, and relates to the treatment of non-combatants in times of hostilities. As per Article 5 thereof, when such a non-combatant is detained as a spy he forfeits his rights of communication under the convention. While such a person must, as per Article 5, be treated with humanity and has the right to a fair trial, there is nothing under IHL which prevents an individual from being sentenced to death for espionage.

IHL also draws a clear distinction between those engaged in hostilities and those engaged in espionage. This principle is enshrined in Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions, reflecting a long-established principle of international law present in earlier international legal instruments. Combatants who adhere to IHL principles are, if captured, immune from prosecution for acts committed while engaging in hostilities. This, however, does not apply to those engaged in espionage: as per Article 46(1) of AP I any member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who falls into the power of the other party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy. Instead, the requirements under Article 75 of AP I are for humane treatment and a fair trial. In this light, therefore, Pakistan is well within its rights to try and sentence Jadhav under its domestic laws for committing espionage.

While Jadhav’s activities were hostile acts, inimical to Pakistan’s national security and stability, even if one were to assume that the peacetime regime of international law applied, India’s claims before the ICJ would remain problematic. India’s declaration to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the ICJ statute ousts the jurisdiction of the court on matters relating to actions taken in self-defence or in resistance to aggression.

As per the well-established international law principle of reciprocity, the caveats India incorporated into its own declaration are also exercisable by Pakistan. The court will thus have to determine whether exercising compromissory jurisdiction would result in a de facto exercise of compulsory jurisdiction in areas over which it lacks jurisdiction. The dispute revolves around the actions of Jadhav, an individual tried and sentenced by a competent court as a spy and saboteur, and thus necessarily falls within the purview of “actions taken in self-defence or in resistance to aggression”.

Furthermore, even if the court decides that it has jurisdiction in this case it is highly unlikely it will establish admissibility as all local remedies have not yet been exhausted; even if the case reaches the merits — and India is successful — a determination of a violation of consular access still has no bearing on the illegality of Jadhav’s actions or the nature of his awarded punishment as such are beyond the scope of the VCCR.

Jadhav’s situation, while peculiar, is not entirely without precedent. In Medellin v. Texas the accused was a Mexican national tried and sentenced to death by the courts of Texas, despite Mexico being denied consular access to him. Following his appeal, the US Supreme Court — upholding Medellin’s sentence — held that even if a treaty constitutes an international obligation it is not binding under domestic law unless the treaty is self-executing or the legislature enacts the necessary implementing legislation.

The court also held that the ICJ’s decisions were nonbinding under domestic law and that, without authority from the legislature or the constitution, the head of state could not unilaterally enforce international treaties or ICJ decisions. While proceedings were under way before US domestic courts, Mexico moved the ICJ on much the same grounds as India has —ie denial of consular access to the accused. And while the ICJ finally held in favour of Mexico, the courts of the US nonetheless asserted the supremacy of domestic law over the pronouncements of the ICJ and the VCCR.

Sikander Ahmed Shah is former legal adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and law faculty at Lums. Abid Rizvi is an expert on international law.

Comment: ICJ hearing — Pakistan could succeed; India may suffer knockout

TAIMUR MALIK | MUHAMMAD BILAL RAMZAN

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has initiated proceedings to determine whether ICJ has jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter referred to it by India relating to the death sentence given to an Indian national, Kulbhushan Jadhav, in Pakistan.

India claims that by disallowing consular access to Jadhav, Pakistan has committed a violation of its commitments as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).

Pakistan needs to put up effective legal arguments before the ICJ which will initially involve challenging the jurisdiction of the ICJ to adjudicate upon India’s application. The first hearing will be held on Monday, May 15, at the ICJ in The Hague, Netherlands.

This article will, therefore, primarily deal with the question of ICJ’s jurisdiction and before we delve into an analysis of ICJ’s jurisdiction in the instant matter, it is important to understand that ICJ’s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon contentious matters is consensual and can be based on: a special agreement containing the assent of the parties recognising the jurisdiction of the ICJ to decide the dispute between them; recognition of ICJ’s jurisdiction particularly in respect of “matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force” or optional clause declaration under Article 36 (2) of ICJ’s Statute which allows states to “recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court”.

Hence, ICJ can only proceed to decide an application on merits provided its jurisdiction stands established on the basis of any one of the foregoing conditions.

In the instant matter, India has contended that the jurisdiction rests with the ICJ in terms of Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (OP) to VCCR which provides that, “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” and since both, Pakistan and India, are parties to the OP, ICJ can, therefore, proceed to decide India’s application on merits.

On an initial review, it may appear to one that Pakistan may not be in a position to raise any strong objections to the jurisdiction of ICJ. However, careful perusal of the available record and the Indian application to the ICJ reveals that the two countries signed an ‘Agreement on Consular Access’ (Agreement) dated 21 May 2008 which not only modifies the obligations that the two countries have towards each other in respect of allowing consular access but also nullifies the applicability of VCCR to the extent of such access.

More importantly, the Agreement, unlike the OP to VCCR, does not provide for any dispute resolution mechanism that the two sides have agreed upon.

Therefore, any dispute arising in respect of the Agreement requires specific assent of both the parties for it to be adjudicated upon by the ICJ. Furthermore, the Agreement in clause (vi) provides that in the case of arrest or detention on grounds of security, each side (Pakistan and India) may examine the case on its merits, and does not contain any obligation to either inform the other party or allow consular access.

What follows as a necessary corollary is that Pakistan was well within its right to examine Jadhav’s case on its merits for he had been detained pursuant to his involvement in subversive activities.

The foregoing argument stems from Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which is the document enshrining rules of interpretation pertaining to treaties. Article 30 (3) of VCLT provides in explicit terms that:

“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”

Article 30 (3) is further supplemented by Article 30 (4) (a) which provides that:

“When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one” but “two parties, each of which is a party to both treaties, the same rule applies as in paragraph 3 (Article 30 (3))”.

Accordingly, considering that the instant case is built around arguments related to consular access, it is evident, in terms of Article 30 (3) of VCLT, that VCCR remains applicable between Pakistan and India to the exclusion of Article 36 of VCCR, meaning that there is no express obligation on Pakistan to grant consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav and that this case can be decided by Pakistan on its merits.

Furthermore, the Agreement does not contain any clause which may hint that the Agreement is operative subject to VCCR. Therefore, it can be argued that the Optional Protocol to VCCR thereby becomes inapplicable in the instant matter barring ICJ from assuming jurisdiction in this case.

One potential resistance against the foregoing argument would branch out from Article 102 of the UN Charter which requires member states to register treaties and international agreements entered into by them with the UN Secretariat – the consequence of non-registration being that the non-registered treaty, in this case the Agreement, may not be invoked before any UN organ. India would, therefore, contest any argument based on the Agreement coming from the Pakistani side.

But any resistance based on Article 102 of the Charter can be effectively countered based on the fact that Article 102 does not completely bar a member state from relying on an unregistered agreement since the term used in Article 102 is ‘may’ and not ‘shall’.

In Qatar versus Bahrain, ICJ held that, “Non-registration or late registration, on the other hand, does not have any consequence for the actual validity of the agreement, which remains no less binding upon the parties.”

The observation is further supplemented by Article 26 of the VCLT which requires parties to a treaty to uphold and perform its provisions in good faith. ICJ observed in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case that the intention of the parties in concluding a treaty should prevail. Non-registration of the Agreement would, therefore, not affect the applicability of the Agreement in the present case.

Moreover, India has not denied the Agreement and it is quite possible that two states have acted under the Agreement several times which increases the prospects of its application in the instant matter.

The foregoing is an analysis of what is likely to happen in the first few hearings with Pakistan objecting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the hearing that will take place on 15th May 2017.

It is probable that Pakistan would succeed in the very first round and India will suffer a technical knockout resulting from ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction to decide the instant matter.

US must do ‘something different’ in Afghanistan

WASHINGTON - The Pentagon’s intelligence chief has said that the work of American and NATO forces to stabilise Afghanistan is at risk of being squandered.

Lt-Gen Vincent Stewart, the Defence Intelligence Agency’s director, told a Senate panel on Thursday that the US must do “something very different” in Afghanistan or else the Taliban will make new advances on the battlefield. He maintained that the current stalemate in fighting could then tip in the Taliban’s favour.

Stewart said he visited Afghanistan six weeks ago to see the situation for himself. His grim assessment comes as the Trump administration considers sending a few thousand more troops to Afghanistan, mainly to boost training and advising of Afghan forces.

In the same hearing, the head of US intelligence agencies also offered a pessimistic assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan. “The political and security situation in Afghanistan will also almost certainly deteriorate through 2018, even with a modest increase in the military assistance by the US and its partners,” Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats said at the hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

“Afghanistan will struggle to curb its dependence on external support until it contains the insurgency or reaches a peace agreement with the Taliban,” Coats told lawmakers in presenting an annual assessment of threats to US national security.

US-led forces have been fighting in Afghanistan for 16 years, making it America’s longest war, yet the situation there remains a stalemate.

The Taliban, which first emerged in the mid-1990s in southern Afghanistan, managed to conquer most of the country before its 2001 ouster with the help of a range of foreign jihadists, including Pakistanis, Saudis and Chechens.

But it has been on the rebound, Coates said, and continues to gain strength. “The Taliban are likely to continue to make gains, especially in rural areas,” said the US spy chief, adding that efforts to bolster local military have been less fruitful than hoped.

“Afghan security forces’ performance will probably worsen due to a combination of Taliban operations, combat casualties, desertions, poor logistics support and weak leadership,” he said.

“Afghanistan will struggle to curb its dependence on external support until it contains the insurgency or reaches a peace agreement with the Taliban.”

“Although the Taliban were unsuccessful in seizing a provincial capital in 2016, they effectively navigated their second leadership transition in two years following the death of their former chief, Mullah Mansoor, and is likely to make gains in 2017,” Coats said.

“The overall situation in Afghanistan will very likely continue to deteriorate, even if international support is sustained,” he said.

“Kabul’s political dysfunction and ineffectiveness will almost certainly be the greatest vulnerability to stability in 2017,” Coats said.

Coats said the fighting will also continue to threaten US personnel, allies, and partners, particularly in Kabul and urban population centres.

America has about 8,400 troops in Afghanistan. Most belong to a 13,300-strong NATO mission to train and advise Afghan partner forces fighting the Taliban.

Last month, the United States dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb ever deployed in combat in Afghanistan, targeting an Islamic State complex.

President Donald Trump is reportedly weighing whether to send as many as 5,000 more troops to Afghanistan. The US currently has about 8,400 troops stationed in the country.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer said Trump has asked military advisers “to relook at the entire strategy” in Afghanistan. Trump is expected to make a decision on the plan sometime in the coming days.

America’s Endless Afghan War

by William J. Astore,

News this week that 300 Marines have returned to Helmand Province in Afghanistan recalls the failed surge of 2009-10, when roughly 20,000 Marines beat back the Taliban in the region, only to see those “fragile” gains quickly turn to “reversible” ones (to cite the infamous terms of General David Petraeus, architect of that surge).

While fragility and reversibility characterize American progress, the Taliban continues to make real progress. According to today’s report at FP: Foreign Policy, “the Taliban controls or contests about 40 percent of the districts in the country, 16 years after the U.S. war there began.” Meanwhile, in January and February more than 800 Afghan troops were killed fighting the Taliban, notes Foreign Policy, citing a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. That’s a high figure given that fighting abates during the winter.

Besides committing fresh US Marines to more Afghan security forces “training,” the US military has responded with PR spin. For example, when friendly Afghan forces abandoned a district and police headquarters, a US spokesman claimed it had been “repositioned.” According to FP: Foreign Policy, “US forces helped in ferrying [Afghan] government troops and workers out, and American jets came back to destroy the rest of the buildings and vehicles left behind.” Literally, the old district center and its resources had to be destroyed, and a new one created, for the Afghan position to be “saved.”

Destroying things to “save” them: Where have we heard that before? The Vietnam War, of course, a lesson not lost on Aaron O’Connell, a US Marine who edited the book Our Latest Longest War: Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan. O’Connell’s recent interview with NPR cites the Vietnam example as he explains the one step forward, two steps back, nature of America’s Afghan War. In his words:

So we’ve spent billions building roads in Afghanistan, but we then turned the roads over to the Afghans in 2013. We trained up a maintenance unit so that it could provide for road maintenance, and nothing has happened since then. Now, today, more than half of the roads are deemed unfit for heavy traffic. And as one taxi driver put it in 2014 – things have gotten so much worse, now if we drive too fast, everyone in the car dies.

So it’s – really, we have to think about the things that are sustainable.

Americans have spent an enormous amount of money in Afghanistan without thinking about how to sustain the improvements we’ve funded. Meanwhile, as O’Connell notes, the security situation (as in lack of security) in Afghanistan undermines those infrastructure efforts.

With respect to US efforts to create a viable Afghan Army, O’Connell doesn’t mince words about its failings:

[T]he massive assembly-line attempt to produce capable, professional national security forces has not worked well, and it’s been at tremendous cost. And for all those who say we should just keep doing what we’re doing in Afghanistan, let me explain why that’s not sustainable. Every year, between a quarter and a third of the Afghan army and the police desert. Now, these are people that we have armed and trained. We’ve given weapons to them. We’ve given them basic military training. And every year, a third of them disappear [with their guns].

Here’s the grim reality: US military efforts to take charge and win the war, as in “winning hearts and minds” (known as WHAM) in 2009-10, proved unsustainable. Follow-on efforts to turn the war over to the Afghan government (analogous to LBJ and Nixon’s “Vietnamization” policy in the waning years of the Vietnam War) are also failing. Yet America’s newest commanding general in Afghanistan wants yet more troops for yet more “training,” effectively doubling down on a losing hand.

The logical conclusion – that’s it’s high-time US forces simply left Afghanistan – is never contemplated in Washington. This is why Douglas Wissing’s book, Hopeless But Optimistic: Journeying through America’s Endless War in Afghanistan, is so immensely valuable. Wissing is a journalist who embedded with US forces in Afghanistan in 2013. His book consists of short chapters of sharply drawn vignettes focusing on the street and grunt level. Its collective lesson: Afghanistan, for Americans, doesn’t really exist as a country and a people. It exists only as a wasteful, winless, and endless war.

What is Afghanistan to Americans? It’s an opportunity for profit and exploitation for contractors. It’s a job as well as a personal proving ground for US troops. It’s a chance to test theories and to earn points (and decorations) for promotion for many officers. It’s hardly ever about working closely with the Afghan people to find solutions that will work for them over the long haul.

A telling example Wissing cites is wells. Americans came with lots of money to drill deep water wells for Afghan villagers and farmers (as opposed to relying on traditional Afghan irrigation systems featuring underground channels that carry mountain water to the fields with minimal evaporation). Instead of revolutionizing Afghan agriculture, the wells drove down water tables and exhausted aquifers. As the well-digging frenzy (Wissing’s word) disrupted Afghanistan’s fragile, semiarid ecosystem, powerful Afghans fought to control the new wells, creating new tensions among tribes. The American “solution,” in sum, is exacerbating conflict while exhausting the one resource the Afghan people can’t do without: water.

Then there’s the “poo pond,” a human sewage lagoon at Kandahar Air Field that was to be used as a source for organic fertilizer. I’ll let Wissing take the tale from here:

But instead of enriching Afghan soil, the U.S.-led coalition forces decided to burn the mountains of fertilizer with astronomically expensive imported gasoline. The [US air force] officer reminded me that the Taliban got $1500 in protection money for each US fuel tanker they let through, so in the process the jihadists were also able to skim the American shit [from the poo pond].

Walking back, I spot a green metal dumpster stenciled with a large sign that reads, “General Waste Only.” At that moment, it seems to sum up the whole war.

Wissing’s hard-edged insights demonstrate that America is never going to win in Afghanistan, unless “winning” is measured by money wasted. Again, Americans simply see Afghanistan too narrowly, as a “war” to won, as a problem to be managed, as an environment to be controlled.

Indeed, the longstanding failure of our “answers” is consistent with the military’s idea we’re fighting a generational or “long” war. We may be failing, but that’s OK, since we have a “long” time to get things right.

After sixteen years and a trillion dollars, the answer in Afghanistan is not another sixteen years and another trillion dollars. Yet that’s exactly what America seems prepared to do in the endless war that to us defines Afghanistan.

Situation in Kashmir never scarier: RAW’s former chief

NEW DELHI: A former head of India’s external spy agency RAW believes that the situation in India-held Kashmir was never scarier, not even in the 1990s when armed resistance was at its peak, the Indian Express reported on Wednesday.

Asked in an interview by the paper if the ongoing unarmed uprising was going from bad to worse under the current government, former Research and Analysis Wing chief A.S. Dulat said yes.

“Yes, the situation is turning worse. Is it worse than in 1990? My answer is yes and no. It is worse in terms of atmospherics. Because of alienation and the anger of youth, young Kashmiri minds have gone out of control.

“There is a sense of hopelessness. They aren’t afraid to die. Villagers, students and even girls are coming out on the streets. This has never happened in the past,” he said.

A.S. Dulat says today they [Kashmiris] are proud of being stone-pelters

Mr Dulat served in Srinagar in the 1980s as a special director of the Intelligence Bureau when he supervised the intelligence network there, the paper said. In the PM’s Office during the Vajpayee government, he was adviser on Kashmir, work that formed the basis of his book “Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years”.

Mr Dulat said the armed militancy and the intensity of violence witnessed in 1990 was not there now. “There were more guns then… Actual militancy was more then but today the situation is scarier. When stone-pelting is done by youths, and girls, it’s abnormal… Today, they are proud of being stone-pelters. They are no longer hiding. Schoolgirls and women are coming out to throw stones. The Kashmir situation has never been so bad,” Mr Dulat said.

What does the future hold for Kashmir in the short term?

“It doesn’t look good…. The sad part, frightening part and really scary part of Kashmir is that these boys and girls with stones in their hands don’t seem to care what their parents feel. There is so much distrust in Kashmiri families that a father doesn’t know what his son is doing and the son doesn’t care anymore what his father thinks.”

Mr Dulat said it was a puzzle why India was hesitant to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan.

“I have never understood why India is afraid to talk about Kashmir with Pakistan? They have more explaining to do. I agree (Prime Minister Narendra) Modiji started well. He surprised all of us by going to Pakistan. The snag here is what happened after it. The crux of the whole thing is that Pakistan is not an easy state to engage with.”

India’s present stance that talk and terror can’t go together was also meaningless vis-à-vis Pakistan. “Here things happen at many layers. We have to talk, disregarding incidents here and there. Surely, we need explanations for Uri, Gurdaspur and Pathankot. But I am told the NSAs of both sides are talking even now… Dialogue must happen between the foreign secretaries and PMs. Modiji is a master of theatre, so he can make it happen. Nawaz Sharif is also a karigar. In a sense, it’s an even scale… I am sorry to say but it’s easier to talk to Pakistan than to Kashmiris.”

The uprising after the killing of Burhan Wani surprised Pakistan. “They returned with a vengeance…In the last five years, Pakistan tried its best to unite all factions of Hurriyat. They failed but now they have got together because this Indian government doesn’t even look at them.”

The Indian government failed to anticipate the consequences from the killing of Wani. “Yes, absolutely. Let me say that we have invited Pakistan back into the Valley. By October things had climbed down. Kashmiris hibernate in winter wearing firan and with their kangadsi. That’s the best time to engage Kashmiris. We didn’t.”

Last winter we didn’t exploit the relative calm. Now children are out on the streets. Modiji had an edge when he came to power. But talks didn’t happen.”

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2017

Ivanka publishes self-help book, cites Pakistani entrepreneur as inspiration

NEW YORK: US First Daughter Ivanka Trump revived ethics concerns Tuesday by publishing a self-help book for working women, which was immediately criticised for offering little help to millions of Americans living outside the moneyed elite.

"Women Who Work: Rewriting the Rules for Success" was released simultaneously in hardback, ebook, 497-minute audio download and CD, Donald Trump´s favorite child sitting on the cover in a dark frock.

The purpose of the book, she writes, is to empower others with skills she has learned in matters as diverse as starting companies, negotiating, maximizing your influence at work and "helping change the system to make it better for women."

The text is peppered with quotations from the likes of Mahatma Gandhi, business leaders Jeff Bezos and Sheryl Sandberg, even former secretary of state Colin Powell.

Among the women she cities as her inspirations is Pakistani-origin entrepreneur Umber Ahmad, who left Wall Street to open her own bakery.

Umber, the child of Pakistani immigrants who came to the States right before she was born, graduated from MIT and the University of Pennsylvania. She rose through the ranks at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, working in investment banking and private equity, before leaving the Street to pursue her passion for baking.

The name of her pastry shop ‘Mah-Ze-Dahr’ is derived from the Urdu word ‘mazedar’ meaning ‘delicious’ in English. Umber began selling her bakery items online, before eventually expanding to a physical shop in Manhattan in 2016.

´Completely out of touch´

Ivanka Trump, the millionaire mother of three, assistant to the president and wife of White House advisor Jared Kushner, says she wrote the tome, published by Penguin business imprint Portfolio, before her father´s shock election.

She took leave from the family real estate business and her eponymous clothing line in January. She is now an unpaid federal employee, with an office in the West Wing, who fulfills duties traditionally carried out by a first lady.

Yet the book spotlights the gulf between the gilded world of a 35-year-old woman thought -- with her husband -- to still hold investments worth up to $740 million and the struggles facing middle- or working-class working women.

She makes only fleeting reference to a nanny as she details an exhausting schedule for managing her companies, her household and date nights with her husband.

At extremely busy times, such as her father´s presidential campaign, she admits: "I wasn´t treating myself to a massage or making much time for self-care."

She references her joy at spending weekends "at our country home in New Jersey," her love of transcendental meditation and shares tips on treating your children to a "spa bath:" run the shower for steam, play rain forest music and lower the lights.

Fatima Goss Graves, incoming president of the National Women´s Law Center that promotes equality for women and families, wrote in US News that the book was "completely out of touch with the obstacles working women face."

"Millions of women are in no position to follow any of this advice."

The New York Times, a newspaper repeatedly criticized by the Republican president, called it "not really offensive so much as witlessly derivative." The "why of her book becomes easy to discern. She´s extending the Trump brand."

Online booksellers Amazon listed the book with an average of three out of five stars, an instant bestseller in the category of "job hunting and careers."

Alongside glowing reviews extolling her as a role model with practical advice, irrate comments criticised her as a woman of privilege who never had to work.

Likely galling to many a hard-up student will be the revelation that Anna Wintour, the legendary editor of Vogue, called her in person to offer her a job while she was yet to graduate -- a position which she "graciously declined."

Ivanka, who uses social media to showcase a carefully curated image, reveals that she shared the first picture of her daughter only after being ambushed by paparazzi.

She justified sharing a photograph of herself digging in the garden with "messy" hair and "dirt on my cheek" thinking it might help "debunk the superwoman myth."

Ivanka was pre-paid an advance for the book, but has tried to fend off concerns that she is profiting from public office by promising to donate further profits to charity and announcing that she would not go on a promotional tour.

"In light of government ethics rules, I want to be clear that this book is a personal project. I wrote it at a different time in my life," she wrote on Facebook.

The book closes with her often-stated desire for the United States to enshrine paid leave and affordable high-quality childcare, but offers no concrete blueprint on how that might be achieved.